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Invoking What Rule?
Michael Flynn*
The sequestration of witnesses has been a part of Florida trial practice
since at least 1906.' The purpose of the sequestration rule is to "avoid the
coloring of a witness's testimony by that which he has heard from other
,,2witnesses. By "invoking the rule," the court in a criminal or civil case can
insure that the testimony of each witness stands on its own and is not
influenced, tainted or purposefully altered because of other witness
testimony.3 The procedure at common law for "invoking the rule" at trial
was simple. A lawyer for either side of a case simply asked the judge to
"invoke the rule."4 Then the court, in its discretion, immediately ruled to
grant or deny the request for sequestration of prospective witnesses.5
Ordinarily, the court granted the request for sequestration absent a showing
of extraordinary circumstances. 6 This process for "invoking the rule" was
fast, fair, and inexpensive. The Florida courts still use this process for the
sequestration of potential witnesses during a trial.7 But the application of the
rule of sequestration to deposition proceedings remains unsettled.
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1. WmuAM R. ELEAZEp & GLEN WEiSSENBERGER, FLORIDA EviDENcE: 1999
CouRTROOM MANUAL 425 (1999). See generally Seaboard Air Line RY v. Smith, 43 So. 235
(Fla. 1907) (holding that sequestration was a matter of judicial discretion by trial court,
undisturbed unless there was evidence of abuse of that discretion).
2. Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla. 1961).
3. Dardashti v. Singer, 407 So. 2d 1098, 1099 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct App. 1982). The trial
court has an additional consideration in sequestration of a witness during a criminal trial: the
balancing of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confronting and cross-examination of
witnesses. See Wright v. State, 473 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1985); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332
(Fla. 1982); Dumas v. State, 350 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1977).
4. ELEAzER & WEiSSENBERGER, supra note 1, at 425. Although no written rule was yet
adopted, "invoking the rule' or "the rule" was commonly known among Florida attorneys and
judges as the rule of sequestration. Id.
5. Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1984).
6. Id.
7. Dardashti, 407 So. 2d at 1100. The court in Dardashti quoted Spencer v. State, an
often cited case for the common law mie of sequestration: 'Ordinarily, when requested by either
side, the trial judge will exclude all prospective witnesses from the courtroom' during the trial.
Id. at 1099 (quoting Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla. 1961)). The court used the
language "ordinarily exclude" to mean that not excluding prospective witnesses will only occur
1
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The application of the rule of sequestration to depositions first surfaced
in Florida in the Fourth District Court of Appeal case of Dardashti v.
Singer.8 In that case, the plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of contract
against a defendant.9 The defendant, in his answer, denied the existence of a
contract with the plaintiff.10 Through interrogatories, the defendant learned
that the plaintiff's wife planned to testify in support of her husband's
claim." The district court noted that the plaintiff's wife's testimony was the
only corroborating testimony offered by the plaintiff and was therefore,
essential to substantiate the husband's claim.12 The Dardashti court found,
unlike the trial court, that permitting the plaintiff's wife to sit in on the
deposition of her husband would clearly prejudice and compromise the
plaintiff's wife's testimony.' 3  Based on this finding, the district court
reversed the trial court ruling and granted the defendant's request to "invoke
the rule" and exclude the plaintiffs wife from attending her husband's
deposition. 4 In so ruling, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the
same considerations apply to invoking the rule of sequestration at a trial and
a deposition. 15
It is important to note that the district court did not rely on any Florida
Rule of Evidence in making this decision. 16 Rather, the Dardashti court
relied on the basic premise used to support the application of the rule of
sequestration in any context, namely, the need for untainted testimony. 7 The
court, in its critical analysis of Spencer v. State8 which denied witness
sequestration in a criminal case, reasoned that the failure to apply the
sequestration rule to depositions would not only permit influenced, tainted,
and altered deposition testimony, but also threaten the integrity of a trial on
upon a showing of "extra ordinary circumstances." Id. at 1100. In other words, the general rule
after Dardashti is that either party should grant exclusion of a witness in a deposition upon the
request of the other party.
8. 407 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
9. Id. at 1099-1100.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1100.
12. Id.
13. Dardashti, 407 So. 2d at 1100. ELEAZER & WEISSENBERGER, supra note 1, at 425.
Although no written rule was yet adopted, "invoking the rule" or "the rule" was commonly
known among Florida attorneys and judges as the rule of sequestration. The court noted: "[t]o
have it otherwise would emasculate the rule of exclusion and sequestration of witnesses and
subject the trial courts to attack alleging collusion among witnesses." Dardashti, 407 So. 2d at
1100 (quoting Thomas v. State, 372 So. 2d 997, 999 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
14. Dardashti, 407 So. 2d at 1099-1100.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961).
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the merits.19 Simply stated, the Dardashti court decided that upon the
request of either party at the deposition, the rule of sequestration of potential
witnesses should apply.20
Eight years later, the First District Court of Appeal chose not to apply
the rule of sequestration to depositions in a medical malpractice case.2 In
Smith v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 2 the plaintiff sought to sequester an
eyewitness doctor from attending the deposition of the defendant doctor.
23
The Smith court, while never questioning the reason for the plaintiff's
request to "invoke the rule," stated that the common law rule of seques-
tration only applies to trial proceedings and not depositions.24 The court
further ruled that Rule 1.280(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
which sets out the procedure for obtaining protective orders during the
discovery stage of a lawsuit, dictates the procedure and legal standard for a
lawyer to "invoke the rule" at a deposition.25 Based on this finding, the
district court then ruled that the court in Dardashti had no legal authority for
its decision.26 If the Smith court is right, the procedure for "invoking the
rule" in a deposition just became more time consuming, less immediate, and
more costly.
The Smith court recognized that its decision was in direct conflict with
the decision in Dardashti and certified this conflict to the Supreme Court of
Florida in 1990.27
Meanwhile, the Florida Legislature meandered into the witness
sequestration in depositions debate, while waiting for the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision on the subject. For its part, the Florida Legislature
enacted section 90.616(1) of the Florida Statutes for inclusion as part of the
Florida Rules of Evidence.28 Section 90.616(1) of the Florida Statutes states
in pertinent part that "at the request of a party the court shall order, or upon
its own motion the court may order, witnesses excluded from a proceeding
so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses .... 29 The good
19. Dardashi, 407 So. 2d at 1100 (citing Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla.
1961)).
20. Id.
21. Smith v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 564 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
22. 564 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. lst Dist. CL App. 1990).
23. Id. at 1115.
24. Id. at 1117. The court noted not only that Dardashti had no legal authority for its
decision but also that the reasoning is not applicable to depositions but only to trials. l
25. Id.
26. Smith, 564 So. 2d at 1117.
27. Id. at 1118. The court granted the Motion for Certification of Direct Conflict. Id.
28. FLA. STAT. § 90.616 (1999).
29. Id. The rest of the rule reads:
(2) A witness may not be excluded if the witness is:
(a) A party who is a natural person.
1999]
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news about this statute is that the legislature explicitly makes the
sequestration of potential witnesses mandatory upon the request of a party
and implicitly supports the traditional reasons for "invoking the rule."'"
While the statute resolves some questions, it prolongs the debate about
whether the sequestration rule applies to depositions. The use by the
legislature of the word "proceeding" is too imprecise. The use of the word
"proceeding" suggests that the legislature did intend to apply this rule of
evidence to proceedings other than trials.31 Yet the legislature does not
define the word proceeding either in the statute or in the legislative history
of the statute.32 Does "proceeding" mean only evidentiary hearings?33 Is
voir dire a "proceeding" within the meaning of the statute?m What about
summary judgment or preliminary injunction hearings?35 Is a deposition a
proceeding? How is a practitioner to know what to do?
First, if one would apply the statutory construction rule that a court
should apply the procedural or evidentiary rule most on point, it would seem
(b) In a civil case, an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural
person. The party's attorney shall designate the officer or employee who
shall be the party's representative.
(c) A person whose presence is shown by the party's attorney to be
essential to the presentation of the party's cause.
(d) In a criminal case, the victim of the crime, the victim's next of kin, the
parent or guardian of a minor child victim, or a lawful representative of
such person, unless, upon motion, the court determines such a person's
presence to be prejudicial.
Id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. The Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement of section 90.616 of the
Florida Statutes employs the word "proceeding" in a description of the statute but never defines
it. Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement for Senate Bill 1350 (1990). In
describing sequestration of a law enforcement officer in a criminal proceeding, the Statement
quotes Randolph v. State for trial sequestration. Id. (quoting Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 1098
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). The Statement also cites Dardashti for the proposition that
sequestration is a matter of right. Id. (citing Dardashti v. Singer, 407 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)). Also note that the Statement does not disclaim the Dardashti application of
sequestration rule to depositions. Could this be implicit legislative approval of the result in
Dardashti?
33. By using "proceeding," the legislature is tacitly approving a line of cases in criminal
law. Sequestration is utilized in voir dire; see Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1990);
Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1984); and suppression hearings; see Bryant v. State, 656 So.
2d 426 (Fla. 1995); Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1984). Question: if the legislature is
putting a stamp of approval on these cases, did the legislature in the process also approve of
Dardashti? If not, at least the door is certainly open for its application to depositions.
34. See FLA. STAT. § 90.616 (1999).
35. See id.
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that Rule 1.280(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to
"invoking the rule" at a deposition.36  This means that a party will be
required to set for hearing a motion for a protective order to sequester
potential witnesses from a deposition.37 However, since the term "proceed-
ing" is not defined by the legislature, a court might decide that the term is
ambiguous and open to interpretation. 38  If the term "proceeding" is
ambiguous, then a court may turn to sources other than the statute's language
for guidance. In that case, the Florida courts would look to the directly
conflicting decisions of the Dardashti and Smith cases for guidance.4 Then,
any court would be further confused because the Supreme Court of Florida
has never ruled on the certification of these two directly conflicting appellate
decisions.41
Acknowledging the good intentions of the legislature in attempting to
clarify the rule of sequestration and the Supreme Court of Florida's benign
neglect in ruling on the certification for appeal based on the legislature's
enactment, lawyers must feel a little unsettled about the sequestration rule.
Simply stated, a Florida lawyer should take the time and spend the money to
use Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(c) concerning protective orders to
"invoke the rule" in deposition proceedings. It seems such a shame to add
the sequestration of prospective witnesses from a deposition to the list of
time consuming, inefficient and costly tasks for judges, lawyers and litigants.
Perhaps this is one instance where that curious Florida practice of "invoking
the rule" was better off left alone, without judicial or legislative interven-
tion.42
36. FLA. R. COv. P 1.280(c). As a rule of statutory construction, the statute that is on
point controls over another statute that merely refers to or speaks more generally to the issue.
McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted). The statute on point is
considered an exception to the general principles of the broader statute. Id. (citations omitted).
37. Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, similar to Rule 1.280 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a protective order to exclude witnesses from a
deposition. Rule 26(c)(5) provides, in pertinent part: "the ourt... may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense, including... that discovery be conducted with no one present except
persons designed by the court." Id.
38. Cf. State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973) (citations omitted).
39. Id. Where a statute utilizes clear language, a court may not interpret any terms and
must enforce the statute as it is written. Id However, an ambiguity could be the springboard
from which courts may interpret section 90.616 of the Florida Statutes to apply to depositions.
40. Dardashti, 407 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. Southern
Baptist Hosp., 564 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
41. SeeSmith,564So.2datll15.
42. See Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1984); Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729
(Fla. 1961); Seaboard Air Line RY v. Smith, 43 So. 235 (Fla. 1907); Dardashti v. Singer, 407 So.
211098 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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